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Abstract
Robustness estimation is critical for the design and maintenance of resilient networks, one of the global
challenges of the 21st century. Existing studies exploit network metrics to generate attack strategies,
which simulate intentional attacks in a network, and compute a metric-induced robustness estimation.
While some metrics are easy to compute, e.g. degree centrality, other, more accurate, metrics require
considerable computation efforts, e.g. betweennes centrality. We propose a new algorithm for estimating
the robustness of a network in sub-quadratic time, i.e., significantly faster than betweenness centrality.
Experiments on real-world networks and random networks show that our algorithm estimates the
robustness of networks close to or even better than betweenness centrality, while being orders of
magnitudes faster. Our work contributes towards scalable, yet accurate methods for robustness
estimation of large complex networks.
1 Introduction
Man-made networks exhibit highly similar statistical characteristics, while displaying substantial
non-trivial topological features [2, 7]. During the last decades, empirical studies have shed light on the
topology of air transportation networks [19], electrical power grids [1], the Internet backbone [21],
inter-bank networks [8], etc. Most of these networks carry a well-recognized resistance towards random
failures [4] but are particularly susceptible to intentional attacks, which target relatively important nodes
in the network, e.g. specific nodes that are highly connected, so-called hubs [3]. If such attacks occur,
networks disintegrate rapidly. Famous examples of recent extensive, wide-ranging network failures
include European air traffic disruption caused by Icelandic volcano Eyjafallajo¨kull [9], large-scale power
outages in the United States [5, 6], Internet-based computer attack spreading [18], and cross-continental
supply-chain shortages in the Japanese tsunami aftermath [13]. Such disruptions cause high economic
costs [11] and, thus, analyzing and improving network resilience remains one of the critical challenges.
In order to measure the robustness of a network, a notion of network robustness was proposed in [17].
Given a network with N nodes, the robustness is defined as R = 1N
∑N
Q=1 s(Q), where s(Q) is the size of
the giant component (GC size) after removing Q nodes. The value of R depends significantly on the
underlying attacking strategy, i.e. the order in which node removals occur. Studies on network
robustness usually select a single network metric, e.g. degree, betweenness, or collective influence [15], to
generate a ranking for inducing the order. This approach has several limitations.
1) The obtained R value reflects the robustness against a particular attacking strategy, for instance,
by attacking high-degree nodes first. In Figure 1, we show a visualization of the celegansneural network
together with the evolution of the network’s robustness (measured by GC size) while being attacked
according to different rankings. We can observe a wide range of results; yielding significantly different
robustness estimations of the network. In general, one is interested in the worst-case robustness,
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Figure 1. Visualization (left) and robustness curves induced by different network metrics (right) for the
network of celegans neural. The variety of robustness curves suggests a range of R values between 0.24
(interactive betweenness, IBET) and 0.41 (Collective influence with ball size 3, ICI3). The goal is to
identify a minimum R value, which is a worst case estimation of the network robustness.
represented by the minimum R value. Note that it can be even more effective to eliminate a combination
of hubs and central, but less-well-connected, nodes [14,16] or other nodes identified by artificial
intelligent techniques [20].
2) Different network metrics have significantly different computational requirements. For instance,
computing the betweenness of all nodes in the network, a strategy which has been shown rather effective
for attacking complex networks, needs at least time quadratic in the number of nodes. This makes it
very difficult to obtain good attacks (leading to smaller R values) for very large networks with millions of
nodes. For instance, the computation of betweenness values in a network with 100,000 nodes takes
almost one day on today’s consumer computers; and doubling the size of the network further quadruples
the execution time.
3) A fixed ranking assumes that an attack of length n is a good prefix for an attack of length n + 1.
This is often not the case, as our simple example in Figure 2 shows.
4) Last but not least, existing studies often employ a fixed-length interval sampling strategy for
computing the size of the giant component less than N times; in order to avoid further increases on time
complexities. This static sampling yields to overestimated network robustness, particularly for large
vulnerable networks.
In this paper, we propose a new technique (QRE=Quick Robustness Estimation) for estimating the
robustness of a network, as expressed by R, in subquadratic time. We assign the importance of nodes by
exploiting approximate betweenness centrality, which estimates the centrality of nodes by sampling a
sub-collection of node pairs. Furthermore, we iteratively adapt sampling intervals fitting the shape of the
robustness curves, yielding an increasingly improved solution after each iteration. Experiments on
real-world networks and random networks show that QRE estimates R-values close to or even better
than interactive betweenness centrality, while having attractive computational properties. Our work
contributes towards scalable, yet accurate methods for robustness estimation of complex networks.
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Figure 2. Node e (green) has the highest betweenness and attacking e splits the network into two
components with GC size four. However, when attacking two nodes, e is not part of the best attack
anymore, since any attack containing e will necessarily have a GC size of four (only one components can
be broken down further). The best attack with two nodes contains c and f , leading to a GC size of two.
Relying on rankings misses such cases.
2 Methods
We propose QRE, an algorithm for estimating the robustness of a network, which needs less than
quadratic time in the number of nodes. Conceptually, our algorithm consists of two stages:
2.1 Initial sample shaping by degree
We obtain a first approximation of the network robustness by splitting the interval [0, N ] into X
equi-length sub-intervals. For each such sub-interval, we attack nodes according to the decreasing degree.
The metric is recomputed for each interval. From these results, we obtain the GC size for 100 sampled
points in [0, N ], at p1 to pX , with gcs1 to gcsX . We derive a step-function from these samples as sf(Q),
where sf(Q) = gcsi, such that i is maximal with pi ≤ Q and pi+1 > Q. We materialize this curve as a
list of elements gcsmin = [sf(x) | x ∈ [0, N ]] and compute the preliminary R of the network as
R0 =
1
N
∑N
Q=1 gcsmin.
2.2 Improvement by approximate betweenness
We split the interval [0, N ] into 100 equi-depth sub-intervals, according to the curve obtained by a(Q).
This often leads to significantly different sample points than equal-length intervals obtained in Step 1).
For each such sub-interval, we iteratively compute an attack according to the decreasing approximate
betweenness of a node. In order to approximate the betweenness, we perform betweenness sampling with
Y node pairs [12]. From these results, we obtain the GC size for 100 sampled points in [0, N ], at p1 to
pX , with gcs1 to gcsX . We combine these new samples with the previously materialized curve
(representing the best known attacks so far) as follows: gcsnewmin = [min(gcsmin[x], sf(x)) | x ∈ [0, N ]],
where sf(Q) = gcsi, such that i is maximal with pi ≤ Q and pi+1 > Q. The R of the network is updated
as R0 =
1
N
∑N
Q=1 gcsmin. Step 2) is repeated for Z times.
2.3 Time Complexity
This first step is performed in O(X ∗N ∗ logN) steps, while the second step is performed in
O(X ∗ Y ∗ Z ∗ logN). For our experiments, we chose X=100, which guarantees a precision of two digits
for the obtained R values. Furthermore, we let Y = Z = sqrt(logN). In this way, we obtain an overall
sub-quadratic time complexity of O(N ∗ logN ∗ logN).
3 Results
3.1 Evaluation Setup and Data Sources
We report the results of our evaluation on 15 real-world networks and two types of random networks. All
experiments were executed on a server with with 32 cores and 320 GB RAM, running Fedora 21 (Linux
4.1.13-100.fc21.x86 64). Each competitor was implemented in a single-threaded fashion, using the
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Figure 3. Robustness scores (R values) for 15 real-world networks (from UCI and SNAP) using 11
techniques. The best technique, in terms of minimum R value, is indicated with green color. Techniques
whose computations did not finish within 24 hours are marked with a red dashed line. It can be seen that
QRE computes the minimum R value for the majority of cases (8/15), closely followed by interactive
betweenness (6/8). For dataset hep-th, collective influence with ball size 3 computes the minimum R
value.
network library NetworKit1. All datasets are available to download from either the UCI Network Data
Repository 2 or the Stanford Large Network Dataset Collection 3, and have been studied extensively.
They cover a variety of network structures and network scales, ranging from a dozen of nodes (dolphins,
lesmis) to more than a million of nodes (com-youtube.ungraph, roadNet-CA). Moreover, we have
performed experiments with two types of random networks (Baraba´si-Albert and Erdo¨s-Renyi).
3.2 Robustness estimations for real-world networks
In Figure 3, we present the estimated robustness (R values) for all 15 networks computed by different
techniques: DEG (=degree), BETW (betweenness), PR (pagerank), CI2 (collective influence [15] with
ball size 2), CI3 (collective influence with ball size 3), and QRE (the approach proposed in this study).
The symbol ’I’ in front of a technique’s name indicates an interactive attack, where the node ranking is
recomputed after attacking a prefix of nodes. It can be seen that QRE computes the minimum R value
for the majority of cases (8/15), followed by interactive betweenness (6/15). In Figure 4, we report the
running times using the 11 techniques on real-world networks. Smaller networks with less than few
hundred nodes can be analyzed by all techniques within a few seconds. However, as the size of the
network grows, several of them do not scale well anymore. IBET needs already 18 hours for
1Available at https://networkit.iti.kit.edu/
2Available at https://networkdata.ics.uci.edu/index.php
3Available at https://snap.stanford.edu/data/
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Table 1. List of 15 datasets used in our experiments, ranked with an increasing number of nodes.
Robustness estimations are based on interactive betweenness; only results obtained within 24 hours of
computation are shown (others are marked with ∗).
Network —N— —L— Est. R Time in s
dolphins 62 159 0.18 0.07
lesmis 77 254 0.12 0.09
polbooks 105 441 0.20 0.17
adjnoun 112 425 0.23 0.27
football 115 613 0.32 0.23
celegansneural 297 2148 0.25 0.79
polblogs 1490 16715 0.15 10.59
netscience 1589 2742 0.04 0.93
power 4941 6594 0.04 25.50
hep-th 8361 15751 0.07 67.34
astro-ph 16706 121251 0.13 1076.38
twitter combined 81306 2420765 0.09 65666.80
web-BerkStan 685230 7600595 ∗ ∗
com-youtube.ungraph 1134890 2987624 ∗ ∗
roadNet-CA 1965206 5533214 ∗ ∗
twitter combined with approx. 80000 nodes. Collective influence with ball size 2 needs 16-20 hours for
dataset web-BerkStan; Collective influence with ball size 3 scales even worse, since more neighbors need
to be traversed. The simple techniques based on degree and pagerank scale well with the number of
nodes, outperforming QRE slightly. In Figure 5, we compare the size of the giant component against a
number of attacked nodes for the three most interesting techniques: Static degree (fast to compute),
Interactive betwenneess (small R values, but time consuming), and QRE (trade-off). In Figure 6, we
evaluate the influence of the number of iterations on the R value of a network. Usually, after a few
number of iterations, the value is not decreased further significantly.
3.3 Robustness estimations for random networks
We have performed additional experiment with two random graph models: Baraba´si-Albert and
Erdo¨s-Renyi. In Figure 7, we report the estimated robustness of 100 artificial networks, for interactive
betweenness (IBET) and our novel technique (QRE). There exists a strong correlation between both
scores, indicating that QRE accurately estimates the robustness even for random networks. In few cases,
for networks with 0.15 ≤ R ≤ 0.25, IBET finds even better attacks than QRE.
4 Discussion
Our robustness estimation technique, QRE, scales up to large networks with millions of nodes and edges,
since the overall time complexity is in O(N ∗ logN ∗ logN), where N is the number of nodes in the
network. Based on our experiments with real-world and artificial networks, we conclude that QRE fills a
nice sweet spot between fast, yet ineffective degree centrality and slow, yet highly effective betweenness
centrality. The results of our study show that efficient, yet accurate robustness estimation is possible
even for very large networks. We believe that this work contributes to a better understanding of
real-world network robustness in face of big data. Moreover, we envision that our technique can be
extended to analyze robustness of networks of networks [10].
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Figure 4. Execution time for all techniques against real-world networks, with a growing number of
nodes. IBETW and BETW scale worst, followed by instances of collective influence. Only QRE and the
simple methods based on degree and pagerank can compute the R values for networks with more than a
million of nodes within reasonable time (less than one hour).
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